Iraq: the art of the long view

I've got a mate with whom I used to catch up for a beer or five every few months, until he became a tree-changer a couple of years ago. One of the last times we got together was just after the (insert obligatory offensive description here) PM eventually admitted that Australia was going to war in Iraq.

We'd barely taken our first sips of beer than I was into it, condemning this decision for all I was worth. As my friend of is generally like-minded persuasion to me, ideologically and politically, I was dumbstruck when he said he supported the invasion.

He then went through his reasoning. He had followed instances of Muslim attacks against the West since Lebanon in 1982 and including Mogadishu, Bali and the USS Cole as well as the World Trade Centre. His view was that there was clear evidence of a widespread, long-running campaign that had to be stopped by, if possible, a single action that would convince those Muslims of extreme views (call them Jihadists or whatever) that the West was serious about defending itself.

Tonight he sent me this article by Bernard Lewis at Princeton which, as he says, sums up his views but with a much clearer and more comprehensive historical perspective. It's certainly to my mind a well-argued piece and not extreme in any way. Just puts the case and says, unless we demonstrate more strength and persistence, eventually we will be overcome.

I can see its point, respect its research and analysis but still find it hard to agree with overall. Does it conflate the objectives of moderate Muslims with the extremist few? (And in any case, how many are the few)?

Iraq has muddied the waters of the argument. The invasion was bungled (well, post Mission Accomplished anyway) and now it is certainly true that should western forces leave, the bloodbath will escalate. Makes it hard morally to abandon the Iraqis although it also seems that most want us gone.

As a thought experiment, I wondered what might have happened if the US and UK and other nations had rationalised the invasion in other terms. Using the arguments laid out in the article was not on: it would have been tantamount to a declaration of war on all Muslim nations. I still think securing access to oil was a principal factor and using that as an excuse wouldn't have washed, either.

Concentrating efforts in Afghanistan, rather than leaving that job 'half-done' and moving on to Iraq, may have been a better move. That said, Afghanistan has proved remarkably impervious to western 'control' in the past, so finding an exit strategy that left the country mostly in friendly hands would not have been simple.

A few brief exchanges of e-mail with my friend tonight show up the complexity of the arguments. He is not keen on use of force as a first resort and only came to his position on Iraq with difficulty. He is certainly no supported of the current Australian government. The current imbroglio...well, how do we exit with some dignity without consigning an even greater number of Iraqis to a dreadful end?